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Abstract
We establish a link between multiwinner elections and apportionment problems by showing
how approval-based multiwinner election rules can be interpreted as methods of apportionment.
We consider several multiwinner rules and observe that they induce apportionment methods that
are well-established in the literature on proportional representation. For instance, we show that
Proportional Approval Voting induces the D’Hondt method and that Monroe’s rule induces the
largest remainder method. We also consider properties of apportionment methods and exhibit
multiwinner rules that induce apportionment methods satisfying these properties.
1 Introduction
The study of preference aggregation mechanisms—in particular, voting rules—is an important part
of multiagent systems research [e.g., Conitzer, 2010]. Recent years have witnessed an increasing
interest in multiwinner elections. In this setting, there is a set of agents who entertain preferences
over a set of alternatives. Based on these preferences, the goal is to select a committee, i.e., a (fixed-
size) subset of the alternatives. Preferences are usually specified either as rankings, i.e., complete
linear orders over the set of all alternatives [e.g., Elkind et al., 2014], or as approval votes, i.e.,
yes/no assessments of all the alternatives [e.g., Kilgour et al., 2006]. We are particularly interested
in the latter variant, in which each agent can be thought of as specifying a subset of alternatives that
are “acceptable” for that agent.
The decision scenario modeled by multiwinner elections—selecting a subset of objects from a
potentially much larger pool of available objects—is ubiquitous: picking players to form a sports
team, selecting items to display in an online shop, choosing the board of directors of a company, etc.
Many of these scenarios are reminiscent of parliamentary elections, a topic that has been studied
in great detail by political scientists. In a parliamentary election, the candidates are traditionally
organized in political parties and the election determines how many parliamentary seats a party is
allocated.
Under so-called proportional representation systems with “closed party lists,” a voter is allowed
to give her vote to one and only one party. In a sense, this forces the voter to approve all candi-
dates from one party and no candidates from any other party. Counting such ballots, and deciding
how many candidates are elected from each list, is an apportionment problem. Any apportionment
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problem can be seen as a very simple approval voting instance: all voters approve all the candidates
from their chosen party, and only those.
The present paper formally establishes and explores this analogy between multiwinner elec-
tions and apportionment problems. We show how an apportionment problem can be phrased as an
instance of an approval-based multiwinner election, thereby rendering multiwinner rules applicable
to the apportionment setting. As a result, every approval-based multiwinner rule induces a method
of apportionment. Exploring this link between multiwinner rules and apportionment methods is
interesting for at least two reasons. First, observing what kind of apportionment method a given
multiwinner rule induces yields new insights into the nature of the rule. Second, every multiwin-
ner rule inducing a given apportionment method can be seen as an extension of the apportionment
method to a more general setting where candidates have no party affiliations (or party affiliations
are ignored in the election process).
The relevance of the latter perspective is due to the realization that closed-list systems have a
number of drawbacks. For instance, it is a known feature of closed-list systems that candidates tend
to campaign within their parties (for being placed on a good position on the party list), rather than
to campaign for the citizens’ votes. Closed-list systems thus favor party discipline, at the potential
expense of alienating the political elites from the citizens [e.g., see Colomer, 2011, Andre´ et al.,
2015, Ames, 1995, Chang, 2005].
In an attempt to overcome these drawbacks, many countries use “open-list” systems, leaving
some flexibility to the voters by allowing them to vote for specific candidates inside the chosen
party list. In some (rare) cases, voters are given even more freedom. Under so-called “panachage”
systems, sometimes used in Luxembourg and in France, voters can vote for candidates from differ-
ent parties. And sometimes voters vote directly for the candidates and the outcome of elections
does not depend on how candidates are grouped into parties. Such is the case for some elec-
tions in Switzerland, were variants of multi-winner approval voting are used in several cantons
[see Laslier and Van der Straeten, 2016]. In a recent book, Renwick and Pilet [2016] extensively
examine this “trend towards greater personalization,” which they see as “one of the key shifts in
contemporary politics.” They find that this trend “is indeed changing core democratic institutions.”
After formally establishing the link between approval-based multiwinner rules and apportion-
ment methods, we consider several multiwinner rules and observe that they induce (and extend)
apportionment methods that are well-established in the apportionment literature. For instance, Pro-
portional Approval Voting (PAV) induces the D’Hondt method (aka Jefferson method) and Monroe’s
rule induces the largest remainder method (aka Hamilton method). We also consider properties of
apportionment methods (such as lower quota or the Penrose condition) and exhibit multiwinner
rules that induce apportionment methods satisfying these properties.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally introduces both the apportionment prob-
lem and the multiwinner election setting. Section 3 shows how approval-based multiwinner rules
can be employed as apportionment methods, and contains several results related to proportional
representation. Section 4 is devoted to non-proportional representation in the form of degressive
proportionality and thresholds, and Section 5 concludes.
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2 The Apportionment Problem and Approval-Based Multiwinner
Elections
In this section we provide the formal setting for the apportionment problem and for approval-based
multiwinner elections. For a natural number t ∈ N = {1, 2, . . .}, let [t] denote the set {1, 2, . . . , t}.
2.1 Apportionment Methods
In the apportionment setting, there is a finite set of voters and a finite set of p parties P1, . . . , Pp.
Every voter votes for exactly one party, and for each i ∈ [p], we let vi denote the number of
votes that party Pi receives, i.e., the number of voters who voted for Pi. The goal is to allocate h
(parliamentary) seats among the parties. Formally, an instance of the apportionment problem is
given by a tuple (v, h), where v = (v1, . . . , vp) ∈ Np is the vote distribution and h is the number of
seats to distribute. We use v+ to denote the total number of votes, v+ =
∑p
i=1 vi. Throughout this
paper, we assume that vi > 0 for all i ∈ [p] and h > 0. An apportionment method M maps every
instance (v, h) to a nonempty set1 M(v, h) of seat distributions. A seat distribution is a vector
(x1, . . . , xp) ∈ N
p
0 with
∑p
i=1 xi = h. Here, xi corresponds to the number of seats allocated to
party Pi.
In our proofs we often argue about seat distributions that result from a given seat distribution
by taking away a single seat from a party and giving it to another party. For a seat distribution
x = (x1, . . . , xp) and two parties Pi and Pj such that xi > 0, let xiyj denote the seat distribution
x′ with x′i = xi − 1, x′j = xj + 1, and x′ℓ = xℓ for all ℓ 6= i, j.
2.1.1 Divisor Methods
A rich and very well-studied class of apportionment methods is defined via divisor sequences.
Definition 1 (Divisor method). Let d = (d(0), d(1), d(2), . . .) be a sequence with 0 < d(j) ≤
d(j + 1) for all j ∈ N0. The divisor method based on d is the apportionment method that maps a
given instance (v, h) to the set of all seat allocations that can result from the following procedure:
Start with the empty seat allocation (0, . . . , 0) and iteratively assign a seat to a party Pi maximizing
vi
d(si)
where si is the number of seats that have already been allocated to party Pi.
Divisor methods are often defined in a procedurally different, but mathematically equivalent way
[see Balinski and Young, 1982, Proposition 3.3].2 Two prominent divisor methods are the D’Hondt
method and the Sainte-Lague¨ method.
Definition 2 (D’Hondt method). The D’Hondt method (aka Jefferson method or Hagenbach-
Bischoff method) is the divisor method based on dD’Hondt = (1, 2, 3, . . .). Therefore, in each round,
1Most apportionment methods allow for ties. In this paper we do not consider any specific tie-breaking rule but rather
assume that the apportionment methods might return several tied outcomes.
2Divisor methods with d(0) = 0 can also be defined. For such methods, which Pukelsheim [2014] calls impervious,
the conventions vi
0
= ∞ and vi
0
≥
vj
0
⇔ vi ≥ vj are used. Examples of impervious divisor methods are the methods
due to Huntington and Hill, Adams, and Dean [see Balinski and Young, 1982].
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a seat is allocated to a party Pi maximizing visi+1 , where si is the number of seats that have already
been allocated to party Pi.
The D’Hondt method was first used in 1791 to apportion seats in the U.S. House of Represen-
tatives, and currently it is used as a legislative procedure in over 40 countries.
Definition 3 (Sainte-Lague¨ method). The Sainte-Lague¨ method (aka Webster method, Schepers
method, or method of major fractions) is the divisor method based on dSL = (1, 3, 5, . . .). Therefore,
in each round, a seat is allocated to a party Pi maximizing vi2si+1 , where si is the number of seats
that have already been allocated to party Pi.
The Sainte-Lague¨ method was first adopted in 1842 for allocating seats in the United States
House of Representatives, and currently it is used for parliamentary election in some countries
(for instance Latvia, New Zealand, Norway, or Sweden) and for several state-level legislatures in
Germany.
The following example illustrates the two methods defined above.
Example 1. Consider the instance with four parties P1, P2, P3, P4 and 100 voters such that
(v1, v2, v3, v4) = (6, 7, 39, 48), and assume that there are h = 10 seats to be allocated. The
outcomes of the D’Hondt method and the Sainte-Lague¨ method, which can be computed with the
help of Table 1, are (0, 0, 4, 6) and (1, 1, 4, 4), respectively.
P1 P2 P3 P4
vi/1 6 7 39 48
vi/2 3 3.5 19.5 24
vi/3 2 2.33 13 16
vi/4 1.5 1.75 9.75 12
vi/5 1.2 1.4 7.8 9.6
vi/6 1 1.17 6.5 8.0
vi/7 0.86 1 5.57 6.86
P1 P2 P3 P4
vi/1 6 7 39 48
vi/3 2 2.33 13 16
vi/5 1.2 1.4 7.8 9.6
vi/7 0.86 1.0 5.57 6.86
vi/9 0.67 0.78 4.33 5.33
Table 1: Tables illustrating the computation of the D’Hondt method (left table) and Sainte-Lague¨
method (right table) in Example 1. A column corresponding to party Pi contains the ratios
vi/d(0), vi/d(1), vi/d(2), ... with the sequences of denominators given by the respective divisor method
(the ratios are rounded to two decimal places). The h = 10 largest numbers in this table are printed
in bold and correspond to the seat allocation.
As we can see in the above example, different divisor methods might give different results for
some instances of the apportionment problem. In particular, the D’Hondt method slightly favors
large parties over small ones in comparison to the Sainte-Lague¨ method [Pukelsheim, 2014].
Several other divisor methods such as the Huntington-Hill method (aka the method of equal
proportions), the Adams method (aka method of smallest divisors), and the Dean method are studied
in the literature on fair representation. We refer the reader to the books of Balinski and Young [1982]
and Pukelsheim [2014] for an extensive overview.
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2.1.2 The Largest Remainder Method
The largest remainder method is the most well-known apportionment method that is not a divisor
method. Recall that v+ =
∑p
i=1 vi denotes the total number of votes.
Definition 4 (Largest remainder method). The largest remainder method (aka Hamilton method or
Hare-Niemeyer method) is defined via two steps. In the first step, each party Pi is allocated ⌊vihv+ ⌋
seats. In the second step, the remaining seats are distributed among the parties so that each party
gets at most one of them. To do so, the parties are sorted according to the remainders vih
v+
− ⌊vih
v+
⌋
and the remaining seats are allocated to the parties with the largest remainders.
The largest remainder method was first proposed by Alexander Hamilton in 1792 and it was used
as a rule of distributing seats in the U.S. House of Representatives between 1852 and 1900 [e.g.,
Pukelsheim, 2014]. Currently, it is used for parliamentary elections in Russia, Ukraine, Tunisia,
Namibia and Hong Kong.
Example 2. Consider again the instance in Example 1. According to the largest remainder method,
in the first step, party P1 is allocated ⌊6·10100 ⌋ = 0 seats, P2 gets ⌊7·10100 ⌋ = 0 seats, P3 gets ⌊39·10100 ⌋ = 3
seats, and P4 gets ⌊48·10100 ⌋ = 4 seats. There are three more seats to be distributed among the parties.
The three highest fractional parts are 910 for party P3, 810 for party P4 and 710 for party P2, thus these
three parties are allocated one additional seat each. The resulting seat allocation is (0, 1, 4, 5).
2.1.3 Properties of Apportionment Methods
The literature on fair representation has identified a number of desirable properties of apportionment
methods [Balinski and Young, 1982, Pukelsheim, 2014]. In this paper, we focus on properties re-
quiring that the proportion of seats in the resulting apportionment should reflect, as close as possible,
the proportion of the votes cast for respective parties.
Definition 5. An apportionment method respects lower quota if, for every instance (v, h), each
party Pi gets at least ⌊vihv+ ⌋ seats. An apportionment method respects quota if each party Pi gets
either ⌊vih
v+
⌋ or ⌈vih
v+
⌉ seats.
Clearly, any apportionment method respecting quota also respects lower quota. It is well known
that the largest remainder method respects quota, but no divisor method does. Moreover, the
D’Hondt method is the only divisor method respecting lower quota [Balinski and Young, 1982].
2.2 Approval-Based Multiwinner Election Rules
We now introduce the setting of approval-based multiwinner elections. We have a finite set N =
{1, 2, . . . , n} of voters and a finite set C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} of candidates. Each voter expresses
their preferences by approving a subset of candidates, and we want to select a committee consisting
of exactly k candidates. We will refer to k-element subsets of C as size-k committees, and we let
Ai ⊆ C denote the set of candidates approved by voter i ∈ N . Formally, an instance of the approval-
based multiwinner election problem is given by a tuple (A, k), where A = (A1, A2, . . . , An) is a
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preference profile and k is the desired committee size. An approval-based multiwinner election rule
(henceforth multiwinner rule) R is a function that maps every instance (A, k) to a nonempty set3
R(A, k) of size-k committees. Every element of R(A, k) is referred to as a winning committee.
2.2.1 OWA-Based Rules
A remarkably general class of multiwinner election rules is defined via ordered weighted averaging
(OWA) operators [Thiele, 1895, Yager, 1988, Skowron et al., 2015]. A weight sequence is an infinite
sequence of real numbers w = (w1, w2, . . .).4
Definition 6 (OWA-based rules). Consider a weight sequence w, a committee S ⊆ C , and a voter
i ∈ N . The satisfaction of i from S given w is defined as uwi (S) =
∑|Ai∩S|
j=1 wj . Given an instance
(A, k) of the multiwinner election problem, the w-based OWA rule selects all size-k committees S
that maximize the total satisfaction ∑i∈N uwi (S).
Note that multiplying a weight sequence w by a positive constant does not change the way in
which a rule operates. Several established multiwinner election rules can be described as OWA-
based rules.
Definition 7. The Chamberlin–Courant rule is the OWA-based rule with weight sequence wCC =
(1, 0, 0, . . .).
The Chamberlin–Courant rule is usually defined in the context of multiwinner elections where
voter preferences are given by ranked ballots, and each voter derives satisfaction only from their
most preferred member of the committee [Chamberlin and Courant, 1983]. Our definition of the
rule is a straightforward adaption to the approval setting: a voter is satisfied with a committee if and
only if it contains at least one candidate that the voter approves of.
Definition 8. Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) is the OWA-based rule with weight sequence
wPAV = (1,
1
2 ,
1
3 , . . .).
Though sometimes attributed to Forest Simmons, PAV was already proposed and discussed by
the Danish polymath Thorvald N. Thiele in the 19th century [Thiele, 1895].5 According to PAV,
each voter cares about the whole committee, but the marginal gain of satisfaction of an already
satisfied voter from an additional approved committee member is lower than the gain of a less
satisfied voter. The reason for using the particular weight sequence wPAV is not obvious. Aziz et al.
[2015] and Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. [2016] provide compelling arguments by showing that wPAV is
3In order to accommodate tied outcomes, multiple committees might be winning.
4Originally, OWA-based rules have been defined for a fixed committee size k, by a vector of k weights rather than by
an infinite sequence. Since our focus is on multiwinner election rules that operate on arbitrary committee sizes, we need
some way of grouping OWA-based rules for different values of k into a single OWA-based rule that works for arbitrary
values of the committee size. We assume that the weight vector for the committee size k is built by appending a weight
to the vector for the committee size (k − 1). Thus, a single OWA-based rule can be represented by an infinite weight
sequence. Another approach would be to represent an OWA-based rule by the collection of vectors of weights (one vector
for each possible size of the committee).
5We are grateful to Xavier Mora and Svante Janson for pointing this out to us.
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the unique weight sequence w such that the w-based OWA rule satisfies certain axiomatic properties.
Theorem 2 in the present paper can be viewed as an additional—though related—argument in favor
of the weight sequence wPAV.
Definition 9. The top-k rule is the OWA-based rule with weight sequence wtop-k = (1, 1, 1, . . .).
According to the top-k rule, the winning committee contains the k candidates that have been
approved by the greatest number of voters.
The following example illustrates the OWA-based rules defined above.
Example 3. Let k = 3 and consider the following preference profile with 12 voters:
A1 = {c1} A5 = {c1, c4, c5, c6} A9 = {c2}
A2 = {c1, c3, c5} A6 = {c1, c4, c5, c6} A10 = {c3, c5}
A3 = {c1, c5, c6} A7 = {c1, c4} A11 = {c3}
A4 = {c1, c5, c6} A8 = {c2, c4, c6} A12 = {c3}
According to the Chamberlin–Courant rule, the committee {c1, c2, c3} is the unique winner in this
profile. Indeed, for this committee each voter approves of at least one committee member (voters
1–7 approve of c1, voters 8 and 9 approve of c2, and voters 10–12 approve of c3), thus each voter
gets satisfaction equal to 1 from this committee. Clearly, this is the highest satisfaction that the
voters can get from a committee. The reader might check that {c1, c2, c3} is the only committee for
which each voter has at least one approved representative.
According to Proportional Approval Voting, {c1, c3, c6} is the unique winner. Let us now com-
pute the PAV satisfaction of voters from this committee. Voters 1, 7, 8, 10–12 approve of a single
committee member, thus the satisfaction of these voters is equal to 1. Voter 9 does not approve
any committee member, thus her satisfaction is equal to 0. The remaining 5 candidates approve of
two committee members, so their satisfaction from a committee is equal to 1 + 12 . Thus, the total
satisfaction of the voters from {c1, c3, c6} is equal to 6+5 · 32 = 13.5 and it can be checked that the
satisfaction of voters from each other committee is lower.
The top-k rule, on the other hand, selects committee {c1, c5, c6} as the unique winner. Indeed,
c1, c5 and c6 are approved by 7, 6, and 5 voters, respectively, and any other candidate is approved
by less than 5 voters.
Other appealing OWA-based rules include the t-best OWA rule, which is defined by the weight
sequence w = (1, . . . , 1, 0, 0 . . .) with t ones followed by zeros, and the t-median OWA rule, which
is defined by the weight sequence w = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, 0, . . .), where the 1 appears at position t
[Skowron et al., 2015].
2.2.2 Sequential OWA-Based Rules
Another interesting class of multiwinner election systems consists of sequential (or iterative) vari-
ants of OWA-based rules.
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Definition 10. The sequential w-based OWA rule selects all committees that can result from the
following procedure. Starting with the empty committee (S = ∅), in k consecutive steps add to the
committee S a candidate c that maximizes
∑
i∈N ui(S ∪ {c}) − ui(S).
Just like OWA-based rules, sequential OWA-based rules have already been considered by Thiele
[1895]. Sequential Proportional Approval Voting (referred to as “reweighted approval voting” by
Aziz et al. [2015]) was used for a short period in Sweden during the early 1900s [Janson, 2016].
Interestingly, a sequential OWA-based rule approximates the original rule whenever the weight
sequence w is non-increasing [Skowron et al., 2015]. Sequential OWA-based rules are appealing
alternatives to their original equivalents for a number of reasons. First, they are computationally
tractable, while finding winners for the original OWA-based rules is often NP-hard. Second, the
sequential rules often exhibit properties which the original rules do not have; for instance, they
(trivially) satisfy committee monotonicity while some of the original versions do not [see, e.g.,
Elkind et al., 2014]. Third, sequential methods are easier to describe to non-experts, as compared
to rules formulated as non-trivial combinatorial optimization problems.
Example 4. Consider the instance from Example 3. Sequential Proportional Approval Voting se-
lects candidate c1 in the first iteration. In order to decide which candidate is selected in the second
iteration, one must compare all remaining candidates with respect to their contribution to the total
satisfaction of the voters. For instance, by selecting c3 the satisfaction of voters will increase by
1
2 +3. One can check that there are two optimal choices in the second step: selecting c3 or selecting
c5. If c3 is selected in the second step, then our procedure will select c6 in the third step (selecting
c6 increases the satisfaction of voters by 1 + 4 · 12 ). If c5 is selected in the second step, then c3
must be chosen in the third step (by choosing c3 we increase the satisfaction of voters by 13 + 5 · 12 ).
Consequently, there are two winning committees according to Sequential Proportional Approval
Voting: {c1, c3, c5} and {c1, c3, c6}.
2.2.3 Monroe’s Rule
The optimization problem underlying the Chamberlin–Courant rule can be thought of in terms of
maximizing representation: every voter is assigned to a single candidate in the committee and this
“representative” completely determines the satisfaction that the voter derives from the committee.
The rule proposed by Monroe [1995] is based on the same idea; However, Monroe requires each
candidate to represent the same number of voters. For the sake of simplicity, when considering the
Monroe rule we assume that the number of voters n is divisible by the size of the committee k.
Definition 11. Assume that k divides n and consider a size-k committee S. A balanced allocation of
the voters to the candidates S is a function τS : N → S such that |τ−1S (c)| = nk for all c ∈ S. The
satisfaction ui(τS) of a voter i from τS is equal to one if i approves of τS(i), and zero otherwise. The
total satisfaction of voters provided by S, denoted u(S), is defined as the satisfaction from the best
balanced allocation, i.e., u(S) = maxτS
∑
i∈N ui(τS). The Monroe rule selects all committees S
maximizing u(S).
Example 5. Consider the instance from Example 3 and consider committee {c1, c2, c3}, which is a
winning committee under the Chamberlin–Courant rule. Even though every voter has an approved
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committee member (voters 1–7 approve of c1, voters 8 and 9 approve of c2, and voters 10–12
approve of c3), this committee has a total satisfaction of 10 only. This is because the function
τ{c1,c2,c3}, defined as
τ{c1,c2,c3}(1) = c1 τ{c1,c2,c3}(5) = c1 τ{c1,c2,c3}(9) = c2
τ{c1,c2,c3}(2) = c3 τ{c1,c2,c3}(6) = c1 τ{c1,c2,c3}(10) = c3
τ{c1,c2,c3}(3) = c1 τ{c1,c2,c3}(7) = c1 τ{c1,c2,c3}(11) = c3
τ{c1,c2,c3}(4) = c1 τ{c1,c2,c3}(8) = c2 τ{c1,c2,c3}(12) = c3
does not satisfy the Monroe criterion (candidate c1 represents more voters than candidates c2
and c3). Under the Monroe rule, {c1, c4, c3} is the unique winning committee. For this commit-
tee, the optimal valid assignment function maps voters 1–4 to their approved candidate c1, voters
5–8 to their approved candidate c4 and voters 9–12 to c3 (only three of those four voters approve
of c3). Thus, the winning committee has a score of 11.
2.2.4 Phragme´n’s Rules
In the late 19th century, Swedish mathematician Lars Edvard Phragme´n proposed several meth-
ods for selecting committees based on approval votes [Phragme´n, 1894, 1895, 1896]. Here, we
formulate two particularly interesting variants [see Brill et al., 2017].
The motivation behind Phragme´n’s rules is to find a committee whose “support” is distributed
as evenly as possible among the electorate. For every candidate in the committee, one unit of “load”
needs to be distributed among the voters approving this candidate. The goal is to find a committee
of size k for which the maximal load of a voter (or the variance of load distribution) is as small as
possible.
Definition 12. Consider an instance (A, k) of the multiwinner election problem. A load distribution
for (A, k) is a matrix L = (ℓi,c)i∈N,c∈C ∈ R|N |×|C| such that
(i) ∑i∈N∑c∈C ℓi,c = k,
(ii) ∑i∈N ℓi,c ∈ {0, 1} for all c ∈ C , and
(iii) ℓi,c = 0 if c /∈ Ai.
Every load distribution L corresponds to a size-k committee SL = {c ∈ C :
∑
i∈N ℓi,c = 1}.
The multiwinner election rules max-Phragme´n and var-Phragme´n are defined as optimization
problems over the set of all load distributions.
Definition 13. The rule max-Phragme´n maps an instance (A, k) to the set of size-k committees
corresponding to load distributions L minimizing maxi∈N
∑
c∈C ℓi,c. The rule var-Phragme´n maps
an instance (A, k) to the set of size-k committees corresponding to load distributions L minimizing∑
i∈N (
∑
c∈C ℓi,c)
2
.
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c1
c2
c3
c1 c2 c3
A1 = {c1}
A2 = {c2}
A3 = {c2, c3}
A4 = {c1, c2, c3}
A5 = {c4}
c1
c2
c2
c1
c4
A1 = {c1}
A2 = {c2}
A3 = {c2, c3}
A4 = {c1, c2, c3}
A5 = {c4}
Figure 1: Illustration of Example 6. The diagram on the left illustrates a load distribution minimiz-
ing the maximal voter load maxi∈N
∑
c∈C ℓi,c, and the diagram on the right illustrates the unique
load distribution minimizing the variance
∑
i∈N (
∑
c∈C ℓi,c)
2
.
Example 6. Let k = 3 and consider the following preference profile with 5 voters:
A1 = {c1} A3 = {c2, c3} A5 = {c4}
A2 = {c2} A4 = {c1, c2, c3}
It can be checked that max-Phragme´n selects the committee {c1, c2, c3} and that var-Phragme´n
selects the committee {c1, c2, c4}. Optimal load distributions corresponding to these committees
are illustrated in Figure 1. Load distributions minimizing the maximal voter load (like the one
depicted on the left in Figure 1) have a maximal voter load of 34 and a variance of 4(34 )2 = 94 , and
the load distribution minimizing the variance of voter loads (depicted on the right in Figure 1) has
a maximal voter load of 1 and a variance of 4(12 )2 + 12 = 2.
3 Apportionment Via Multiwinner Election Rules
In this section we demonstrate how approval-based multiwinner rules can be employed as apportion-
ment methods. For a given instance (v, h) of the apportionment problem, this procedure involves
three steps:
1. Translate (v, h) into an instance (A, k) of the multiwinner problem.
2. Apply the multiwinner rule R to (A, k).
3. Translate committee(s) in R(A, k) into seat distribution(s) for (v, h).
We now describe each step in detail.
Step 1. Given an instance (v, h) of the apportionment problem, we construct an instance (A, k)
of the multiwinner problem as follows. For each i ∈ [p], we introduce a set Ci consisting of h
candidates, and a set Ni consisting of vi voters. Each voter in Ni approves of all candidates in Ci
(and of no other candidates). Furthermore, we define C = ⋃pi=1Ci, N = ⋃pi=1Ni, and k = h.
Intuitively, Ci is the set of members of party Pi and Ni is the set of voters who voted for party Pi.
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Step 2. We can now apply multiwinner rule R to (A, k) in order to find the set R(A, k) of winning
committees.
Step 3. For every winning committee S ∈ R(A, k), we can extract a seat distribution x for the
instance (v, h) in the following way: the number xi of seats of a party Pi is given by the number of
candidates from Ci in the committee S, i.e., xi = |Ci ∩ S|.
The next example illustrates this three-step procedure.
Example 7 (Sequential PAV as an apportionment method). Consider the instance (v, h) =
((20, 40, 30, 10), 10) of the apportionment problem. We construct an instance of the multiwinner
election setting with 40 candidates; each party Pi has a set Ci consisting of 10 candidates. Further,
there are
∑4
i=1 vi = 100 voters: 20 voters approve the ten candidates in C1, 40 voters approve
the ten candidates in C2, 30 voters the ten candidates in C3, and 10 voters the ten candidates in
C4. The Sequential PAV method selects the winning committee by selecting in 10 consecutive steps
candidates from C2, C3, C1, C2, C3, C2, C1, C2, C3, C4. Thus, the corresponding seat allocation
is (x1, x2, x3, x4) = (2, 4, 3, 1).
For a given multiwinner rule R, we let MR denote the apportionment method defined by steps 1
to 3. We say that a multiwinner election rule R satisfies (lower) quota if the corresponding appor-
tionment method MR satisfies the respective property.
3.1 OWA-Based Apportionment Methods
In this section, we consider apportionment methods induced by OWA-based rules. Fix a weight
sequence w and let R denote the w-based OWA rule. For every instance (v, h) of the apportionment
setting, MR(v, h) contains all seat distributions x maximizing the total voter satisfaction u(x),
which is given by
u(x) =
∑
i∈[p]
viu
w
i (x) =
∑
i∈[p]
vi

 xi∑
j=1
wj


. (1)
Here, uwi (x) =
∑xi
j=1wj denotes the satisfaction of a voter from party Pi.
We let uˆ(i, s) denote the marginal increase in u(·) when assigning the s-th seat to party Pi. Due
to (1), we have uˆ(i, s) = viws. Taking away a seat from party Pi and giving it to party Pj results in
a change of total voter satisfaction of
u(xiyj)− u(x) = uˆ(j, xj + 1)− uˆ(i, xi) = vjwxj+1 − viwxi .
Optimality of x ∈MR(v, h) implies that u(xiyj)− u(x) ≤ 0 for all i, j ∈ [p] with xi > 0.
Whenever the weight vector w is non-increasing, the w-based OWA rule induces the same ap-
portionment method as its sequential variant.6
6OWA-based rules with non-increasing weight sequences are very natural, especially when viewed in the context of
apportionment. OWA-based rules with increasing sequences induce apportionment methods that allocate all seats to the
single party that receives the most votes. The same seat distribution can be also obtained by using the OWA-based rule
with a constant weight vector (see Proposition 5).
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Proposition 1. Let w be a weight sequence with wj ≥ wj+1 ≥ 0 for all j ∈ N. The apportionment
method induced by the w-based OWA rule coincides with the apportionment method induced by the
sequential w-based OWA rule.
Proof. Fix a weight sequence w = (w1, w2, . . .) satisfying wj ≥ wj+1 ≥ 0 for all j ∈ N. Let R
be the w-based OWA rule and let R′ be the sequential w-based OWA rule. We show that the
apportionment methods induced by R and R′ coincide, i.e., MR′ = MR.
Consider an instance (v, h) of the apportionment setting. Then MR(v, h) contains all seat
distributions x maximizing the total voter satisfaction u(x), which is given by (1).
Now consider the apportionment method MR′ based on the sequential w-based OWA rule. This
method starts with the empty seat allocation x(0) = (0, . . . , 0) and iteratively assigns a seat to
a party Pi such that the marginal increase in total voter satisfaction is maximized. Recall that
uˆ(i, s) denotes the marginal increase in u(·) when assigning the s-th seat to party Pi. Due to
(1), this quantity is independent of xj for j 6= i and equals uˆ(i, s) = viws. For ℓ = 1, . . . , h,
method MR′ iteratively chooses a party Pi∗ with i∗ ∈ argmaxi∈[p] uˆ(i, x
(ℓ−1)
i ) and sets x(ℓ) =
(x
(ℓ)
1 , . . . , x
(ℓ)
i∗ + 1, . . . , x
(ℓ)
p ).
For every seat allocation x, the total voter satisfaction u(x) can be written as u(x) =∑
i∈[p]
∑xi
s=1 uˆ(i, s). In particular, u(x) is independent of the order in which seats are allocated to
parties. Furthermore, our assumption w1 ≥ w2 ≥ . . . implies that the marginal satisfaction uˆ(i, s)
is monotonically decreasing in s for every party Pi. Therefore, any seat distribution maximizing
u(·) (i.e., any x ∈MR(v, h)) can be iteratively constructed by applying method MR′ .
An immediate corollary is that OWA-based rules with a monotonically decreasing weight se-
quence can be computed efficiently in the apportionment setting.
Further, we can use Proposition 1 to show that every OWA-based rule with a non-increasing
weight sequence induces a divisor method. For a weight sequence w = (w1, w2, . . .), let dw =
(dw(0), dw(1), . . .) be the sequence defined by dw(s) = 1ws+1 for all s ∈ N0. For example, wPAV =
(1, 12 ,
1
3 , . . .) yields dwPAV = (1, 2, 3, . . .).
Theorem 1. Let w be a weight sequence with wj ≥ wj+1 > 0 for all j ∈ N. The appor-
tionment method induced by the w-based OWA rule coincides with the divisor method based on
dw = (
1
w1
, 1
w2
, 1
w3
, . . .).
Proof. Fix a weight sequence w with wj ≥ wj+1 > 0 for all j ∈ N. Let R(w) denote the w-based
OWA rule, and let R′(w) denote the sequential w-based OWA rule. It follows from Proposition 1
that MR(w) coincides withMR′(w). Let furthermore M(dw) denote the divisor method based on dw.
We are going to show that MR′(w) coincides with M(dw).
Both M(dw) and MR′(w) work iteratively. At each iteration, M(dw) assigns a seat to a party Pi
maximizing vi
dw(si)
, where vi is the number of votes for party Pi and si is the number of seats
allocated to party Pi in previous iterations. Method MR′(w), on the other hand, assigns a seat to a
party maximizing the marginal increase in total voter satisfaction. The marginal increase in total
voter satisfaction when giving an additional seat to party Pi equals uˆ(i, si + 1) = viwsi+1.
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Using dw(s) = 1ws+1 , we can observe that the quantities (
vi
dw(si)
)i∈[p] used in divisor method
M(dw) exactly coincide with the quantities (viwsi+1)i∈[p] used in the method MR′(w). Thus, both
methods assign seats in exactly the same way.
3.2 Proportional Approval Voting as an Extension of the D’Hondt Method
A particularly interesting consequence of Theorem 1 is that Proportional Approval Voting, the OWA
rule with wPAV = (1, 12 ,
1
3 , . . .), induces the D’Hondt method.
Corollary 2. The apportionment method induced by PAV coincides with the D’Hondt method.
The observation that PAV reduces to the D’Hondt method in the party-list setting occasionally
occurs (without proof) in the literature [e.g., see Pereira, 2016].7 Theorem 1 shows that this is
just one special case of the general relationship between OWA-based multiwinner rules and divisor
methods.
Since the D’Hondt method satisfies lower quota, the same holds for PAV (and Sequential PAV)
in the apportionment setting.
Corollary 3. PAV and Sequential PAV satisfy lower quota.
The fact that PAV satisfies lower quota can also be established by observing that every multi-
winner rule satisfying extended justified representation [Aziz et al., 2015] or proportional justified
representation [Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al., 2016] also satisfies lower quota. See Appendix A for
details.
Further, we show that PAV is the only OWA-based rule satisfying lower quota.8
Theorem 2. PAV is the only OWA-based rule satisfying lower quota.
Proof. Let R be an OWA-based rule such that MR satisfies lower quota. We will show that R is
based on a weight sequence w with wj = w1j for all j ∈ N, from which we will infer that MR is
equivalent to PAV.
Fix j ∈ N. We will show wj = w1j in two steps.
Step 1. Given a natural number Z > 1, we define an instance (v, h) of the apportionment problem
as follows. There are Z+1 parties and the vote distribution is given by v = (Z, jZ−1, . . . , jZ−1).
That is, party P1 gets Z votes and all other parties get jZ− 1 votes. Thus, the total number of votes
is v+ = Z + Z(jZ − 1) = jZ2. Furthermore, we set h = v+Z = jZ .
Consider a seat allocation x ∈ MR(v, h). Since MR satisfies lower quota, we have x1 ≥⌊
Z·jZ
Z2j
⌋
= 1 and xℓ ≥
⌊
(jZ−1)·jZ
Z2j
⌋
=
⌊
(jZ−1)
z
⌋
= j − 1 for all ℓ 6= 1. Thus, P1 is allocated at
least one seat, and each of the other Z parties is allocated at least j − 1 seats. From the pigeonhole
7In fact, already Thiele [1895] stated this equivalence, but only in the special case when perfect proportionality is
possible; see the survey by Janson [2016].
8This result also follows from Theorem 1 together with the characterization of the D’Hondt method as the only divisor
method satisfying lower quota [Balinski and Young, 1982, Proposition 6.4]. We give a direct proof for completeness.
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principle we infer that at least one of the parties P2, . . . , PZ+1 gets exactly j − 1 seats. Let Pℓ be
such a party and consider the seat allocation x1yℓ. Since x maximizes u(·), we have
0 ≥ u(x1yℓ)− u(x) = uˆ(ℓ, j) − uˆ(1, 1) = (jZ − 1)wj − zw1.
It follows that wj ≤ w1j ·
Z
Z−1 . Since this inequality has to hold for all natural numbers Z > 1, we
infer that wj ≤ w1j .
Step 2. Next, we construct another instance (v′, h′) of the apportionment problem, again parame-
terized by a natural number Z > 1. There are Z + 1 parties and the vote distribution is v′ is given
by v′ = (jZ,Z − 1, . . . , Z − 1). Thus, v′+ = Z2 − Z + jZ . The number of seats is given by
h′ = v
′
+
Z
= Z + j − 1.
Consider a seat allocation x ∈ MR(v′, h′). Since MR satisfies lower quota, we infer that
x1 ≥
⌊
jZ(Z+j−1)
Z(Z+j−1)
⌋
= j. The pigeonhole principle implies that at least one of parties P2, . . . , PZ+1
gets no seat. Let Pℓ be such a party and consider x1yℓ. We have
0 ≥ u(x1yℓ)− u(x) = uˆ(ℓ, 1) − uˆ(1, j) = (Z − 1)w1 − jZ · wj ,
and thus wj ≥ w1j ·
Z−1
Z
. Again, this inequality holds for all Z , and thus wj ≥ w1j .
We have therefore shown that wj = w1j for all j ∈ N. It follows that w = c · wPAV for some
constant c > 0. As a consequence, R is equivalent to PAV.
Theorem 2 characterizes PAV as the only OWA-based rule respecting lower quota. Since PAV
does not respect (exact) quota, it follows that no OWA-based rule respects quota. Due to Proposi-
tion 1, the same is true for sequential OWA-based rules.
The load-balancing rule max-Phragme´n also induces the D’Hondt method. Indeed, Phragme´n
formulated his rule as a generalization of the D’Hondt method to the general (“open list”) case (see
Janson, 2016).
Theorem 3. The apportionment method induced by max-Phragme´n coincides with the D’Hondt
method.
Proof. In the apportionment setting, optimal load distributions have a very simple structure. Given
a seat distribution x, it is clearly optimal to distribute the load of xi (1 for each seat that is allocated
to party Pi) uniformly among the vi voters of the party. Therefore, the maximal voter load for x
is given by maxi∈[p] xivi . Balinski and Young have shown that the D’Hondt method selects seat
distributions minimizing this quantity [Balinski and Young, 1982, Proposition 3.10].
We note that Phragme´n also proposed a sequential rule based on load distributions. It is straight-
forward to verify that, in the apportionment setting, this variant coincides with max-Phragme´n and
thus also induces the D’Hondt method.
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3.3 Monroe’s Rule as an Extension of the Largest Remainder Method
We now turn to Monroe’s multiwinner rule. It turns out that it induces the largest remainder method.
Theorem 4. Assume that the number of seats divides the total number of voters. Then, Monroe’s
rule induces the largest remainder method.
Proof. Let R denote Monroe’s rule. Recall that Monroe’s rule assigns voters to candidates in a
balanced way, so as to maximize the total voter satisfaction. In the apportionment setting, a voter
in Ni is satisfied if and only if she is assigned to a candidate in Ci. The apportionment method MR
selects seat distributions maximizing the total voter satisfaction.
For a seat allocation x, let u(x) denote the total voter satisfaction provided by x. We can write
u(x) =
∑
i∈[p] u(i, x), where u(i, x) is the total satisfaction that voters in Ni derive from x. For a
given instance (v, h) of the apportionment problem, u(i, x) can be expressed as
u(i, x) =
{
vi if xi ≥ vi hv+ ,
xi
v+
h
if xi < vi hv+ .
Since the case u(i, x) = vi occurs if and only if vi ≤ xi v+h , we have u(i, x) = min(vi, xi
v+
h
) and
u(x) =
∑
i∈[p]
u(i, x) =
∑
i∈[p]
min
(
vi, xi
v+
h
)
. (2)
We show that MR coincides with the largest remainder method for all instances (v, h) such that
v+ divides h. Fix such an instance (v, h) and let x ∈MR(v, h). The proof consists of three steps.
Step 1. We first show that xi ≥ ⌊vihv+ ⌋ for all parties Pi. Assume for contradiction that this is not
the case and let Pi be a party with xi < ⌊vihv+ ⌋. We infer that xi ≤
vih
v+
− 1 and, by the pigeonhole
principle, that there exists a party Pj such that xj > vjhv+ . Thus, u(i, x) = xi
v+
h
and u(j, x) = vj .
Therefore,
u(xjyi)− u(x) = u(i, xjyi) + u(j, xjyi)− u(i, x) − u(j, x)
= (xi + 1)
v+
h
+min
(
vj, (xj − 1)
v+
h
)
− vj − xi
v+
h
=
v+
h
+min
(
vj , (xj − 1)
v+
h
)
− vj ≥
v+
h
> 0,
contradicting our assumption that x ∈MR(v, h).
Step 2. We next show that xi ≤ ⌊vihv+ ⌋ for all parties Pi. Assume for contradiction that this is not
the case and let Pi be a party with xi > ⌈vihv+ ⌉. Similarly as before, we infer that xi ≥
vih
v+
+ 1 and
that there exists a party Pj with xj < vjhv+ . Thus, u(i, x) = vi and u(j, x) = xj
v+
h
. Therefore,
u(xiyj)− u(x) = u(i, xiyj) + u(j, xiyj)− u(i, x) − u(j, x)
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= vi +min
(
vj , (xj + 1)
v+
h
)
− vi − xj
v+
h
= min
(
vj, (xj + 1)
v+
h
)
− xj
v+
h
≥
v+
h
> 0.
As in step 1, we have reached a contradiction.
Step 3. In the first two steps, we have shown that ⌊vℓh
v+
⌋ ≤ xℓ ≤ ⌈
vℓh
v+
⌉ for each party Pℓ. Now we
show that MR coincides with the largest remainder method. For the sake of contradiction, assume
that this is not the case. Then, there exist two parties Pi and Pj such that xi > vihv+ , xj <
vjh
v+
, but
vih
v+
− (xi − 1) <
vjh
v+
− xj . (3)
Therefore,
u(xiyj)− u(x) = u(i, xiyj) + u(j, xiyj)− u(i, x)− u(j, x)
= (xi − 1)
v+
h
+ vj − vi − xj
v+
h
=
v+
h
(
vjh
v+
− xj −
vih
v+
+ xi − 1
)
> 0,
where the inequality is due to (3). We again obtain a contradiction, completing the proof.
An immediate consequence of Theorem 4 is that Monroe’s rule respects quota.
3.4 Phragme´n’s Variance-Minimizing Rule as an Extension of the Sainte-Lague¨
method
We now turn to the Sainte-Lague¨ method. Since the Sainte-Lague¨ method is the divisor method
based on (1, 3, 5, . . .), Theorem 1 implies that it is induced by the w-based OWA rule with weight
sequence (1, 1/3, 1/5, . . .).9 However, this is not the only multiwinner rule inducing the Sainte-
Lague¨ method. Recall that var-Phragme´n is the variant of Phragme´n’s load-balancing methods that
minimizes the variance of the loads.
Theorem 5. The apportionment method induced by var-Phragme´n coincides with the Sainte-Lague¨
method.
Proof. Sainte-Lague¨ [1910] and Owens [1921] have shown that the Sainte-Lague¨ method selects
exactly those seat distributions x minimizing
e(x) =
∑
i∈[p]
vi
(
xi
vi
−
h
v+
)2
=
∑
i∈[p]
x2i
vi
−
h2
v+
.
9The fact that the variant of PAV based on (1, 1/3, 1/5, . . .) reduces to the Sainte-Lague¨ method in the party-list setting
is also stated (without proof) by Pereira [2016].
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[see also Balinski and Young, 1982, pages 103–104]. By ignoring constants, one can see that mini-
mizing e(x) is equivalent to minimizing
∑
i∈[p]
x2i
vi
.
The multiwinner rule var-Phragme´n chooses a committee corresponding to a load distribution L
minimizing
∑
j∈N (
∑
c∈C ℓj,c)
2
. For a given seat distribution x, we can without loss of generality
assume that the load of xi is distributed equally among all vi voters in Ni. Thus, the total load
assigned to a voter j ∈ Ni equals
∑
c∈C ℓj,c =
xi
vi
. Therefore,
∑
j∈N
(∑
c∈C
ℓj,c
)2
=
∑
i∈[p]
vi
(
xi
vi
)2
=
∑
i∈[p]
x2i
vi
.
It follows that both methods solve the identical minimization problem, and thus coincide.
3.5 Other Multiwinner Rules in the Context of Apportionment
In this section we examine two further OWA-based rules, the Chamberlin–Courant rule and the top-
k rule, in the context of apportionment. Since wCC = (1, 0, 0, . . .) and wtop-k = (1, . . . , 1, 0, 0, . . .),
Proposition 1 applies to both rules.
The Chamberlin–Courant apportionment method produces lots of ties, because it does not strive
to give more than one seat even to parties with a large support. In the special case where the
number p of parties exceeds the number h of seats, the Chamberlin–Courant rules assigns one seat
to each of the h largest parties.10
Proposition 4. Consider an instance (v, h) of the apportionment problem. If p > h, the appor-
tionment method induced by the Chamberlin–Courant rule assigns one seat to each of the h parties
with the greatest number of votes.
Proposition 4 gives an interesting insight into the nature of the Chamberlin–Courant apportion-
ment method: it selects an assembly having one representative from each of the h largest groups of
a given society.
The top-k rule is on the other end of the spectrum of apportionment methods.
Proposition 5. The apportionment method induced by the top-k rule assigns all seats to the party
(or parties) receiving the highest number of votes.
Thus, the top-k rule induces the apportionment method M∗ in Proposition 4.5 of
Balinski and Young [1982]. This apportionment method is often used to select (minority) gov-
ernments. A minority cabinet is usually formed by the party that receives the greatest number of
votes, even if it does not have a majority of the seats.
We conclude this section by mentioning two further rules that are often studied in the con-
text of multiwinner elections. Satisfaction approval voting [Brams and Kilgour, 2014] induces the
same apportionment methods as the top-k rule. And minimax approval voting [Brams et al., 2007]
10In this special case, the apportionment method induced by the Chamberlin–Courant rule coincides with impervious
divisor methods (see Footnote 2).
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induces the apportionment method that assigns the seats in a way that maximizes the number of
seats of the party with the fewest seats. In particular, if there are more parties than seats, then all
committees are winning.
4 Degressive Proportionality and Election Thresholds
In this section, we show that OWA-based multiwinner rules can also be used to induce apportion-
ment methods with appealing properties other than lower quota. We do this by exploring degressive
proportionality, the concept suggesting that smaller populations should be allocated more represen-
tatives in comparison to the quota-based allocation methods, and election thresholds, the concept
saying that a party should only be represented in parliament if it receives at least a certain fraction
of votes. To the best of our knowledge, the OWA-based rules considered in this section have not
been studied before.
4.1 Degressive Proportionality
Despite its mathematical elegance and apparent simplicity, the proportionality principle is not al-
ways desirable. For instance, in an assembly where decisions are taken under simple majority rule,
a cohesive group of 51% has obviously more than a “fair” share. Principles of justice indicate
that, for decisions bodies governed by majority rule, fair apportionment should follow a norm of
degressive proportionality [Laslier, 2012, Koriyama et al., 2013]. In fact, degressive proportional
apportionments can often be observed in parliaments that gather districts, regions, or states of very
different sizes, such as the European Parliament.11 We now provide two examples, both of which
are OWA-based.
The Penrose apportionment method (aka square-root method and devised by Penrose
[1946]; see also the work of Slomczynski and ˙Zyczkowski [2006]) allocates seats in such a
way that the number of seats allocated to a party is proportional to the square root of the
votes for that party. It has been proposed for the United Nations Parliamentary Assem-
bly [International Network for a UN Second Assembly, 1987] and for allocating voting weights12
in the Council of the European Union [BBC News, 2004].
Let us say that an apportionment method M satisfies the Penrose condition if, for every instance
(v, h) and for every x ∈ M(v, h), it holds that xi ≥ ⌊h
√
vi∑
ℓ
√
vℓ
⌋ for all i ∈ [p]. Interestingly,
the Penrose condition can be satisfied by using an OWA-based rule. The weight sequence w =
(w1, w2, . . .) achieving this is given by wj = 1j2 for all j ∈ N.
Theorem 6. The apportionment method induced by the OWA-based rule with weight sequence
w = (1, 1/4, 1/9, . . .) satisfies the Penrose condition.
Proof. Let R be the w-based OWA rule with wj = 1j2 for all j ∈ N. We show that MR satisfies
the Penrose condition. Assume for contradiction that for some instance (v, h) of the apportionment
11Even though the composition of the European Parliament is not the result of the application of a well-defined rule, it
is interesting to note that the history of successive negotiations produced such a result [see Rose, 2013].
12The question of allocating voting weights to representatives is formally equivalent to the apportionment problem.
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problem, there is a seat distribution x ∈MR(v, h) with xi < ⌊h
√
vi∑
ℓ
√
vℓ
⌋ for some i ∈ [p]. We infer
that xi ≤ h
√
vi∑
ℓ
√
vℓ
− 1, and, using the pigeonhole principle, that there exists a party Pj such that
xj > h
√
vj∑
ℓ
√
vℓ
. We conclude that xi+1√
vi
<
xj√
vj
, and thus vi
(xi+1)2
>
vj
x2j
. Therefore,
u(xjyi)− u(x) = uˆ(i, xi + 1)− uˆ(j, xj) =
vi
(xi + 1)2
−
vj
x2j
> 0,
contradicting the assumption that x ∈MR(v, h). This completes the proof.
Degressive proportionality is also an important feature of the so-called Cambridge Compromise,
which proposes an apportionment method for the European Parliament based on an affine formula:
each member state should be endowed with a fixed number (5) of delegates plus a variable number,
proportional to the population of the state [Grimmett et al., 2011].
We show that such an apportionment method can be implemented via an OWA-based multiwin-
ner rule.
Proposition 6. Consider an instance (v, h) of the apportionment setting with h ≥ 5p and let Z
be a constant with Z > 5v+. Let R denote the w-based OWA rule with weight sequence w =
(0, 0, 0, 0, Z, 1, 1/2, 1/3, . . .). Then, for every x ∈MR(v, h) and for every i ∈ [p],
xi ≥ 5 and xi − 5 ≥
⌊
vi(h− 5p)
v+
⌋
.
Proof. We first prove that each party gets at least five seats. Indeed, for the sake of contradiction
let us assume that party Pi gets less than five seats. By transferring some votes from other parties
(having more than five representatives) to Pi we increase the satisfaction of supporters of Pi by at
least viZ > 5v+. At the same time, transferring a seat from some party Pj (having more than five
seats) to Pi reduces the satisfaction of the supporters of Pj by at most v+. Thus, such a transfer of
at most five seats improves the total satisfaction of the voters, a contradiction.
We now show that xi − 5 ≥ ⌊vi(h−5p)v+ ⌋ for all x ∈ MR(v, h) and for all i ∈ [p]. For the sake
of contradiction, assume that there is an instance (v, h) of the apportionment problem and a seat
distribution x ∈MR(v, h) with xi− 5 < ⌊vi(h−5p)v+ ⌋ for some i ∈ [p]. Thus, xi− 5 ≤
vi(h−5p)
v+
− 1,
and, by the pigeonhole principle, there exists a party Pj such that xj − 5 > vj(h−5p)v+ . Consequently,
xi−4
vi
<
xj−5
vj
, and thus vi
xi−4 >
vj
xj−5 . Therefore,
u(xjyi)− u(x) = uˆ(i, xi + 1)− uˆ(j, xj) =
vi
xi − 5 + 1
−
vj
xj − 5
> 0,
contradicting the assumption that x ∈MR(v, h). This completes the proof.
4.2 Election Thresholds
OWA-based multiwinner rules also provide an interesting way for implementing election thresholds.
Thresholds in the form of percentage hurdles are often encountered in parliamentary elections [see
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Pukelsheim, 2014, Section 7.6]. For a weight sequence w = (w1, w2, . . .), let w[t] be the weight
sequence obtained from w by replacing the first t elements of w with zeros. The w[t]-based OWA
rule induces an apportionment method that allocates seats to a party only if the number of votes
the party receives exceeds a certain fraction of the total number of votes received by parties with
allocated seats.13 Proposition 7 formalizes this behavior for the weight sequence wPAV.
Proposition 7. Consider an instance (v, h) of the apportionment problem and fix an integer t with
1 ≤ t < h. Let R denote the OWA-based rule with weight sequence wPAV[t]. Then, for all seat
distributions x ∈MR(v, h),
xi > 0 only if vi∑
ℓ∈[p]:xℓ>0 vℓ
>
t
h
.
Proof. Consider a seat distribution x ∈MR(v, h). First, observe that there is at least one party that
is allocated strictly more than t seats. (Otherwise, the total voter satisfaction u(x) would be zero
and could be improved upon by giving all seats to an arbitrary party.) Without loss of generality let
us assume that party P1 is such a party, i.e., x1 > t.
Second, observe that every party that is allocated some seat under x, is allocated strictly more
than t seats. In other word, xℓ > 0 implies xℓ > t. (Otherwise, the total voter satisfaction provided
by x could be improved upon by xℓy1.)
Now consider a party Pi with xi > 0. The argument above implies that xi > t. Let vx+ denote
the total number of votes for parties with allocated seats under x, i.e., vx+ =
∑
ℓ∈[p]:xℓ>0 vℓ. If
vi
xi
≥
vx+
h
, then vi
vx
+
≥ xi
h
> t
h
and we are done. So let us assume that vi
xi
<
vx+
h
. From the pigeonhole
principle we infer that there exists a party Pj with xj > 0 such that vjxj ≥
vx+
h
. Since xj > 0, the
observation above implies that xj > t. Therefore,
0 ≥ u(xiyj)− u(x) = uˆ(j, xj + 1)− uˆ(i, xi) =
vj
xj + 1
−
vi
xi
and thus
vi ≥ xi
vj
xj + 1
= xi
vj
xj
·
xj
xj + 1
> xi
vj
xj
·
t
t+ 1
≥ t
vj
xj
≥ t
vx+
h
.
This completes the proof.
An interesting open question is whether it is possible to naturally modify the definition of the
Monroe system to implement election thresholds.
13 The thresholds implemented by OWA-based apportionment methods differ from real-world election thresholds in
one important aspect: Rather than requiring a certain fraction (say, 5%) of all votes, the thresholds we consider here
require a certain fraction of those votes that are received by parties with allocated seats. An advantage of the latter kind
of threshold requirement is that it can always be satisfied. By contrast, requiring a certain fraction of all votes can lead to
situations in which no party reaches the required number of votes and, therefore, no seat allocation satisfies the threshold
requirement.
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5 Conclusion
In legislative procedures, proportional representation is typically achieved by employing party-list
apportionment methods such as the D’Hondt method or the largest remainder method. These meth-
ods impose proportionality by assuring that each party in a representative body is allocated a number
of representatives that is proportional to the number of received votes.
In this paper we have proposed a simple and natural formal framework that allows us to view
approval-based multiwinner election rules as apportionment methods. This framework has enabled
us to establish correspondences between several multiwinner rules, such as PAV, the Monroe rule,
the top-k rule, and the Chamberlin–Courant rule, and the corresponding apportionment methods.
These results give interesting insights into the nature of the analyzed multiwinner rules, and they
show how traditional apportionment methods can be extended to settings where voters can vote for
individual candidates.
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A Proportional Justified Representation Implies Lower Quota
In this section, we prove that the every multiwinner rule satisfying proportional justified repre-
sentation induces an apportionment method satisfying quota. The following definition is due to
Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. [2016].
Definition 14. Consider an instance (A, k) of the multiwinner election setting and a size-k com-
mittee S. The committee S provides proportional justified representation (PJR) for (C,A, k) if
there does not exist a subset N∗ ⊆ N of voters and an integer ℓ > 0 with |N∗| ≥ ℓn
k
such that
|
⋂
i∈N∗ Ai| ≥ ℓ, but |S ∩ (
⋃
i∈N∗ Ai)| < ℓ. An approval-based voting rule R satisfies propor-
tional justified representation (PJR) if for every instance (C,A, k), every committee in R(C,A, k)
provides PJR for (C,A, k).
Proposition 8. If a multiwinner election rule satisfies proportional justified representation, then it
satisfies lower quota.
Proof. Let R be a multiwinner election rule satisfying PJR, and consider an instance (v, h) of the
apportionment problem. Consider an arbitrary party Pi with i ∈ [p]. Translated to the multiwinner
election setting, there is a group Ni of voters of size |Ni| = vi and every voter in Ni approves all h
candidates in Ci. Define ℓ = ⌊vihv+ ⌋. We have ℓ ≤
vih
v+
and thus vi ≥ ℓv+h .
Let N∗ = Ni. Since |N∗| = vi ≥ ℓv+h and |
⋂
i∈N∗ Ai| = |Ci| = h ≥ ℓ, proportional justified
representation implies that every committee S that is chosen by R satisfies |S ∩ (
⋃
i∈N∗ Ai)| ≥ ℓ.
And since S ∩ (
⋃
i∈N∗ Ai) = S ∩ Ci, we know that xi = |S ∩ Ci| ≥ ℓ. Thus, party Pi is allocated
at least ℓ = ⌊vih
v+
⌋ seats, as desired.
Since Proportional Approval Voting satisfies PJR—and in fact even the stronger property ex-
tended justified representation [Aziz et al., 2015]—it also satisfies lower quota.
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